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Abstract
Every day we make choices under uncertainty; choosing what route to work or which queue
in a supermarket to take, for example. It is unclear how outcome variance, e.g. uncertainty
about waiting time in a queue, affects decisions and confidence when outcome is stochastic
and continuous. How does one evaluate and choose between an option with unreliable but
high expected reward, and an option with more certain but lower expected reward? Here we
used an experimental design where two choices’ payoffs took continuous values, to exam-
ine the effect of outcome variance on decision and confidence. We found that our partici-
pants’ probability of choosing the good (high expected reward) option decreased when the
good or the bad options’ payoffs were more variable. Their confidence ratings were affected
by outcome variability, but only when choosing the good option. Unlike perceptual detection
tasks, confidence ratings correlated only weakly with decisions’ time, but correlated with the
consistency of trial-by-trial choices. Inspired by the satisficing heuristic, we propose a “sto-
chastic satisficing” (SSAT) model for evaluating options with continuous uncertain out-
comes. In this model, options are evaluated by their probability of exceeding an
acceptability threshold, and confidence reports scale with the chosen option’s thus-defined
satisficing probability. Participants’ decisions were best explained by an expected reward
model, while the SSAT model provided the best prediction of decision confidence. We fur-
ther tested and verified the predictions of this model in a second experiment. Our model and
experimental results generalize the models of metacognition from perceptual detection
tasks to continuous-value based decisions. Finally, we discuss how the stochastic satisfi-
cing account of decision confidence serves psychological and social purposes associated
with the evaluation, communication and justification of decision-making.
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Introduction
Every morning most people have to pick a route to work. While the shortest route may be con-
sistently busy, others may be more variable, changing from day to day. The choice of which
route to take impacts the commuting time and is ridden with uncertainty. Decision making
under uncertainty has been studied extensively using scenarios with uncertain rewards [1–3].
In such scenarios, participants choose between multiple lotteries where each lottery can lead to
one of the two (or several) consequences with different probabilities. Standard models like
expected utility theory [4,5] and prospect theory [6] suggest parsimonious formulations for
how the statistics of such binomial (or multinomial) distributions of outcomes determine the
value (otherwise known as utility) of a lottery. These models, for example, explain the fact that
in certain ranges people prefer a small certain reward to bigger more uncertain ones [7,8].
However, the commuting problem described here highlights the pervasive but much less
studied relevance of outcome variance to decisions with continuous (rather than binary) out-
comes. It is not straightforward how one’s choice and evaluation of the route could be decided
using the heuristics applicable to binary win/lose outcomes.
Early studies of bounded rationality [9–11] introduced the concept of satisficing according
to which, individuals replace the computationally expensive question of “which is my best
choice?” with the simpler and most-of-the-times adequately beneficial question “which option
is good enough?”. More precisely, instead of finding the best solution, decision makers settle
for an option that satisfices an acceptability threshold [9]. In the case of commuting, such
acceptability threshold could be "the latest time one affords to arrive at work". A generalization
of the satisficing theory to decision-making under uncertainty suggests that when outcomes
are variable, one could evaluate—with reasonably simple and general assumptions about the
probability distributions of outcomes—the available options’ probability of exceeding an
acceptability threshold [12,13]. Our commuter’s stochastic satisficing heuristic could then be
expressed as "which route is more likely to get me to work before X o’clock?"
The effect of uncertainty on confidence report is commonly studied in perceptual detection
tasks where one has to detect a world state from noisy stimuli (e.g. dots moving to the left or
right) [14–20]. Sanders and colleagues (2016) argued that confidence report in perceptual deci-
sions relates to the Bayesian formulation of confidence used in hypothesis testing. In this view,
subjective confidence conveys the posterior probability that an uncertain choice is correct,
given the agent’s prior knowledge and noisy input information. Generalizing this scheme to
value-based contexts, our probabilistic satisficing heuristic is naturally fit to account for the
computational underpinnings of choice confidence and draws strong predictions about how
confidence would vary with outcome variance. In fact, if choices were made by the probabilis-
tic satisficing heuristic described above, confidence in those choices would be directly propor-
tional to the probability that the chosen option exceeded the acceptability threshold. A choice
whose probability of exceeding the acceptability threshold is higher should be made more con-
fidently than another that barely passes the criterion, even if they have equal expected values.
Here we asked if, and how, human decision makers learn and factor outcome variance in
their evaluation of choices between options with independent continuous returns. We
hypothesised that decision makers use a stochastic satisficing heuristic to evaluate their choices
and that their confidence conveys the estimated probability of the chosen option’s value to
exceed the satisficing criterion. In two experiments, we used two-armed bandit tasks in which
the expected values and variances associated with outcomes of each arm were systematically
manipulated. We tested the stochastic satisficing model against a reward maximizing model
[4,5,13,21] and an expected utility model [22–24] that propose alternative ways of computing
choice and confidence as a function of the estimated statistics of options’ returns.
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Results
Participants performed a two-armed bandit task online where rewards were hidden behind
two doors (Fig 1A) and the reward magnitudes followed different probability distributions
(Fig 1B). On each trial, the participant decided which door to open, and expressed their choice
confidence using a combined choice-confidence scale. Choosing the left side of the scale indi-
cated choice of the left door and distance from the midline (ranged between 1: uncertain, to 6:
certain) indicated the choice confidence. After the decision, the reward behind the chosen
door was revealed and a new trial started. Each experimental condition was devised for a
whole block of consecutive trials during which the parameters (mean and variance) governing
the reward distribution for each door were held constant. Each block lasted between 27 and 35
trials (drawn from a uniform distribution). Transition from one block to the next happened
seamlessly and participants were not informed about the onset of a new block.
Experiment 1
Within each condition, the rewards behind the doors were drawn from Gaussian distributions,
one with a higher mean (65, i.e. the “good” option) than the other door (35, i.e. the “bad”
option). The variances of the bad and good options could independently be high (H = 252 =
625) or low (L = 102 = 100), resulting in a 2x2 design comprising four experimental conditions:
‘vH-vH’, ‘vL-vH’, ‘vH-vL’ and ‘vL-vL’ (Fig 1B). In this notation, the first Capital letter indicates
the variance of the bad (low expected value) option, and the second letter indicates the vari-
ance of the good (high expected value) options. Participants’ trial-by-trial probability of choos-
ing the good option, in each condition, started at chance level and increased with learning
until it reached a stable level after about 10 trials. To assess the level of performance after learn-
ing, we averaged the probability of choosing the good option between trials 10 to 25 in each
experimental condition. Probability of choosing the good option was highest in the ‘vL-vL’
and lowest during the ‘vH-vH’ condition (Fig 1D). A repeated measure ANOVA test with the
variances of the good and bad options as within-subject factors was used to evaluate this pat-
tern. The effects of both variance factors were significant (variance of good option: F(1,194) =
22.24, p = 0.00001, variance of bad option: F(1,194) = 5.2, p = 0.026). This result indicated an
asymmetric effect of outcomes’ payoff variances on choice: increased variance of the good
option reduced the probability of choosing the good option, whereas increased variance of the
bad option increased the probability of choosing the bad option. This variance-dependent
choice pattern demonstrates that decision-making depended not only on the expected
rewards, but also on their variances.
To examine the pattern of confidence reports, we calculated the average confidence
reported on trials 10 to 25 in each condition (Fig 1E). Using a repeated measures ANOVA we
found that the main effect of the good, but not the bad, option’s reward was significant when
choosing the good option (good option variance: F(1,194) = 33.32, p<0.00001, bad option var-
iance effect: F(1, 194) = 0.02, p = 0.89). When choosing the bad option, confidence ratings
were generally lower (paired t-test t(64) = 8.3, p = 10−12) and were not significantly different
across experimental conditions. Therefore, variance affected confidence reports, but only
when choosing the good option.
Several studies in perceptual decision making reported a strong relationship between deci-
sion confidence and reaction time [16,19]. We tested the correlation between each partici-
pant’s trial-by-trial reaction times and their confidence ratings (Fig 2A). Consistent with
previous results, we found that the participants’ correlation coefficients tended to be below 0,
as fast responses were linked to higher confidence (t-test, p = 0.0015 in experiment 1).
Stochastic satisficing account of confidence in uncertain value-based decisions
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Fig 1. Design and results of experiment 1. (A) On each trial participants had to choose between two doors, using a confidence scale. The
choice was determined by the side of the scale used by the participant. Upon decision, the chosen door was opened and the reward was
revealed. See a working demo at http://urihertz.net/BanditConfDemo/ (B) Four different experimental conditions were embedded in a
continuous two-armed bandit task. In each condition, one door had a low expected reward (Bad option) and the other had a high expected
reward (Good option). Expected rewards (mB and mG) were constant across conditions. The variances of the two distributions, however,
changed across conditions and were either high or low, resulting in a 2x2 design (VB (Low/High) x VG (Low/High)). Each condition lasted
between 27 to 35 consecutive trials. (C) Stochastic satisficing model suggests that decisions are evaluated based on the probability of each
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However, these were not as strongly linked across the population, with average correlation
coefficient of R = -0.05, below the critical value of R(240) = 0.13 for significance of 0.05.
We examined the relations between confidence and another behavioural measure–choice
stability. We summed the number of choice switches in five trials sliding window, and subtract
it from five to define the trial-by-trial choice stability. This measure ranged between 5, when
no switches were made and the same option was chosen on all five trials, and 1 when the par-
ticipant switched between every trial in the five trials window. We correlated each participant’s
trial-by-trial stability measure with confidence reports (Fig 2B). We found that the partici-
pants’ correlation coefficients were highly significant in the individual level and in the group
level (average R = 0.26 in experiment 1, p = 10−13).
Fitting models to choice
To examine the use of a probabilistic satisficing heuristic and acceptability threshold in deci-
sions under uncertainty we devised a set of models competing models (See Methods). We
started with a model aimed at maximizing rewards (‘Reward’ model, hereafter) that tracks the
expected reward from each door on every time-step [13,21,25]. Choice is then made according
to the expected reward of each option [4]. We also tested an expected utility model (‘Utility’
model) which penalized options for their payoff’s variance, according to the participant’s risk-
averse attitude [4,22,23] (In the supplementary materials we describe the performance of
door’s outcome exceeding an acceptability threshold (grey dot-dashed line). This probability (area under the curve) is higher for the door
with the high mean expected reward (top) than for the door with the low mean (bottom). (D) Participants’ frequency of choosing the good
option in each experimental condition, averaged across trials 10 to 25. (E) Participants’ confidence reports when choosing the good
(middle panel) or bad (right panel) option. Reports were averaged between trials 10 to 25 of each experimental block. When choosing the
good option, confidence ratings were higher when variance of the good option was low, regardless of the variance of the bad option.
Confidence reports were not significantly different across conditions when choosing the bad option. Error bars represent SEM ( p<0.05,
 p<0.0005).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.g001
Fig 2. Correlations between confidence, reaction time, and stability in Experiment 1. (A) We correlated each
participant’s reaction times with confidence ratings. We found that the participants’ correlation coefficients tended to
be below 0, as fast responses were associated with higher confidence. However, these were not as strongly linked across
the population, with average correlation of R = -0.05 (dashed line). (B) We examined the relations between confidence
and choice stability. We found that the participants’ correlation coefficients were highly significant in the individual
level and in the group level (average R = 0.26, dashed line). Dashed red lines indicate the average correlation
coefficient. Dark colours indicate below significance correlation (Critical value of R(240) = 0.13, p = 0.05). 
p< 0.005,  p< 0.00005.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.g002
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another variant of expected utility model, using power utility function instead of exponential
utility function, S7 Fig).
We added two other models, ‘Reward–T’ and ‘Utility-T’, to our set of competing models by
formalizing the use of acceptability threshold and adding a free parameter ‘threshold’ to the
‘Reward’ and ‘Utility’ models. In these models, on each trial, the unchosen option drifted
towards the value of this parameter. This ‘threshold’ therefore represented the participant’s
expectations of outcome in the game. When this threshold was very high, the participant
would assume that the unchosen option drifted toward this high threshold, making him likely
to switch options often. A participant with a low threshold, however, might stick to an option
even if it yielded low reward, as since the unchosen option would drift towards an even lower
threshold.
We formalized the probabilistic satisficing heuristic in a stochastic satisficing (‘SSAT’)
model [13] in which the mean and variance of rewards obtained by each of the two doors are
tracked in a trial-by-trial manner (see Methods). In this model, decision was made by compar-
ing the probability of each option yielding a reward above an acceptability threshold, i.e. being
good enough. In fact, given the estimated probability distribution over the rewarding outcome
of a choice, the model computed the total mass under this distribution that is above the accept-
ability threshold (Fig 1C). This cumulative quantity was then used to determine the probability
of choosing that option. Such mechanism can capture the asymmetric effect of payoff variance
on choice, as the good option (i.e. higher than threshold) becomes less likely to exceed the
acceptability threshold as its variance increases, while the bad option (below threshold)
becomes more likely to exceed the threshold as its variance increases. Upon making the choice
and receiving reward feedback from the environment, the model updates the distribution over
the value of the chosen action. We also examined a drift version of the SSAT model in which
the value of the unchosen action drifts toward the acceptability threshold (‘SSAT-T’), similar
to the drifting mechanism described above for ‘Reward-T’ and ‘Utility-T’ models.
In the light of previous theoretical studies that examined the optimality of the satisficing,
maximizing and risk aversive models in accruing rewards [13,23,26], we examined our models’
performance in the experimental design. We also examined the rewards accrued by a model
with full knowledge of the reward distribution (‘Omniscient’), and the actual amount of
reward accrued by our participants. For each model we identified the set of parameters that
maximized the model’s accumulated reward under the reward distributions in Experiment 1.
We used these parameters to simulate each model, and compared the amount of reward
accrued by each model (S1 Fig). In accordance with the theoretical optimality analysis [13,23],
we found that all three models performed similarly, and accrued similar amount of reward.
When the drifting mechanism was added (drift of the unchosen option towards the acceptabil-
ity threshold) performance of all models decreased. None of the models accrued as much
reward as the ‘omniscient’ model, as all of them had to learn the statistics of the changing envi-
ronment. In addition, all models performed much better than our participants, indicating that
participants’ behaviour was noisy, falling short of the optimal strategy.
Another line of analysis was carried out to elucidate the differences between the models and
how they operate in our experimental design. We examined the differences in values assigned
to each option in a steady state (i.e. after learning the reward distributions) calculated by each
model in the four conditions of our experimental design (S2 Fig). We found that all models
assigned higher values to the high mean reward option than to the low mean reward option in
almost all the cases and conditions. An optimal (greedy) decision maker would therefore be
able to accumulate similar amount of rewards using either model. However, the value differ-
ences assigned by each model were different in magnitude, if not in direction. This means that
a noisy/exploratory decision maker (e.g. softmax) may be more likely to choose the low mean
Stochastic satisficing account of confidence in uncertain value-based decisions
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reward option in one condition compared with other conditions. Taken together, the two anal-
yses demonstrate that all models have a similar potential for collecting reward under optimal
condition and decision policy. However, our second analysis provided a prediction of the pat-
tern of suboptimal choice when decisions are noisy.
We fitted all models to the choices made by the participants (240 trials per participant,
model fitting was done for each participant independently) using Monte-Carlo-Markov-Chain
(MCMC) procedure [27]. After correction for the number of parameters using Watanabe-
Akaike information criterion (WAIC) [28], we compared posterior likelihood estimates
obtained for each participant, for each model (Table 1). The models using drifting thresholds
all performed better (lower WAIC score) than those not using it, and the ‘Reward-T’ model
gave the best fit to the choice data (paired t-test vs. Reward p = 0.00003, vs. Utility p = 0.00001,
vs. Utility-T p = 0.006, vs. SSAT p = 0.0002, vs. SSAT-T p = 0.0002, Fig 3A). The models’ com-
parisons results were also apparent when comparing the models’ estimated probability of
choosing the good option in each condition to the participants’ choice pattern (S3 Fig). The
models lacking the drift-to-threshold mechanism showed less correspondence to the beha-
vioural results. In addition, both ‘Utility’ models failed to replicate the low probability of
choosing the good option in the vHvH condition (compared to vLvH condition), as they
penalised both high and low mean options for variance in the same manner. We examined
how many participants’ choices were best explained by each of our six models and found that
while some participants’ behaviour was better explained by one of the other models, most of
the participants’ choices were best explained by models that did not track reward variance, in
line with the model comparison results (S4 Fig).
Examining the individual parameters fitted by the models we observed a high correspon-
dence between the ‘Reward-T’ and ‘SSAT-T’ models for both the parameters estimated for
acceptability threshold and the parameters estimated for learning rate (Table 2). This corre-
spondence was captured by high correlation between the individual threshold parameters (R2
= 0.89) and learning-rate parameters (R2 = 0.86) (S5 Fig). Such similarity was not found
between the ‘SSAT-T’ and ‘Utility-T’ models for threshold parameters (R2 = 0.38) nor learn-
ing-rate parameters (R2 = 0.6).
Model predictions for confidence ratings
We hypothesize that confidence in choice reflects the subjective probability that the value of
the chosen option exceeded the acceptability threshold (i.e., the total mass under the value dis-
tribution of the chosen option that is more than the acceptability threshold). To test this
hypothesis, we compared the predictions of our models for confidence to the empirical confi-
dence reports. We used the free parameters fitted to trial-by-trial choice data for each individ-
ual participant, and the values assigned to each option by the different models to draw
predictions for the confidence reports for the corresponding individual. Following previous
studies that examined confidence in value-based decisions [29,30], we defined confidence, for
the ‘Reward’ and ‘Utility’ models, as proportional to the estimated decision variable: means of
options’ rewards for ‘Reward’ models and the expected utilities of options for the ‘Utility’ mod-
els. We focused on trials 10–25 of each experimental condition and regressed the models’ pre-
dictions for these trials from the confidence reports made in these trials by each participant, in
order to obtain the individual goodness of fit for each model (R2) (left column of Table 1,
higher is better). We found that the model which gave the best predictions for trial-by-trial
confidence reports was the ‘SSAT-T’ model, which formalized confidence reports as the proba-
bility of exceeding an acceptability threshold (paired t-test vs. Reward p = 0.04, vs. Reward-T
p = 0.03, vs. Utility p = 0.005, vs. Utility-T p = 0.00002, vs. SSAT p = 0.16, Fig 3B).
Stochastic satisficing account of confidence in uncertain value-based decisions
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To examine the pattern of confidence reports generated by each model, we calculated the
average confidence for each model’s simulation when choosing the good option and when
choosing the bad option in each condition. All models predicted lower confidence when
choosing the bad, as compared to the good, option (Fig 4 and S6 Fig for the non-drifting mod-
els), similar to the observed confidence reports. Additionally, all models predicted similar con-
fidence levels across conditions when the bad option was chosen. When choosing the good
option, however, the SSAT-T model’s predictions were the most consistent with the reports
made by participants. Only the SSAT-T model predicted higher confidence when variance of
the good option was low (i.e. ‘vL-vL’,’vH-vL’). The other models did not predict a variance
effect on confidence.
Our model-comparison approach showed that the use of acceptability threshold parameter
helped explaining participants’ choice behaviour, which was best captured by the ‘Reward-T’
model. Confidence, on the other hand, followed most closely the ‘SSAT-T’ model prediction
of reporting the probability of exceeding the acceptability threshold. A counterintuitive predic-
tion of the model borne out by the behavioural data was the difference between the two condi-
tions involving unequal variances (i.e. vL-vH and vH-vL conditions). Stochastic satisficing
predicted–and the data confirmed–a difference in confidence (c.f. Fig 4, compare vL-vH and
vH-vL) despite identical expected values for the chosen (good) option in these two conditions.
Table 1. Models performance in experiment 1.
Model Sum WAIC Mean ± STD WAIC Mean ± STD Confidence R2
Reward 14,273 226.55 ± 67.67 0.21 ± 0.22
Utility 14,320 227.29 ± 67.48 0.18 ± 0.18
SSAT 14,047 222.96 ± 67.96 0.21 ± 0.22
Reward-T 13,518 214.57 ± 68.79 0.21 ± 0.21
Utility-T 13,813 219.25 ± 64.38 0.17 ± 0.16
SSAT-T 13,695 217.38 ± 67.61 0.24 ± 0.21
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.t001
Fig 3. Models comparison in experiment 1. (A) We compared the ‘Reward T’ model to all the other models by examining the paired
differences in WAIC scores across models and participants. The graph presents the differences of each model’s WAIC from the ‘Reward
T’ model. The ‘Reward T’ model performed significantly better than all other models in explaining participants’ choices. (B) We
compared the ‘SSAT T’ model to all other models by examining the paired differences in R2 scores across models and participants. The
‘SSAT T’ model gave a significantly better prediction of confidence reports than all other models except the ‘SSAT’ model. Error bars
represent SEM.  p<0.05,  p<0.005,  p<0.0005,  p<0.00005.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.g003
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In Experiment 2, we focused on the choice between options with unequal variances to further
tease apart the cognitive substrates of stochastic satisficing.
Experiment 2
To conduct a more rigorous test of the parsimony and plausibility of the stochastic satisficing
heuristic, in Experiment 2, we designed a new payoff structure for the two-arm bandit, focus-
ing on options with unequal variances in all conditions (Fig 5A). We kept the mean and vari-
ance of the bad option constant across conditions (mean = 35 and variance = 102 = 100) while
varying the mean and variance of the better option in a 2x2 design. Mean reward of the good
option could be low (mL = 57; still better than the bad option) or high (mH = 72), and its vari-
ance could be independently low (vL = 52 = 25) or high (vH = 202 = 400). Thus, we constructed
four experimental conditions all involving options with unequal variances and large or small
Table 2. Estimated models’ parameters for experiment 1 (Mean ± STD).
Model Beta Learning Rate Acceptability Threshold Variance Learning Rate Risk Aversion
Reward 6.84 ± 3.67 0.61 ± 0.21
Utility 0.71 ± 0.38 0.55 ± 0.23 0.36 ± 0.15 0.91 ± 1.06
SSAT 5.65 ± 3.46 0.64 ± 0.21 0.52 ± 0.13 0.32 ± 0.21
Reward-T 8.48 ± 3.88 0.56 ± 0.19 0.33 ± 0.13
Utility-T 0.86 ± 0.45 0.49 ± 0.20 0.41 ± 0.17 0.39 ± 0.13 0.66 ± 0.63
SSAT-T 5.34 ± 2.37 0.58 ± 0.18 0.35 ± 0.13 0.31 ± 0.15
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.t002
Fig 4. Model predictions for confidence reports in experiment 1. (A) Trial-by-Trial confidence reports averaged across participants (grey line) and model
predictions during each experimental condition are displayed (shaded areas represent SEM). While the ‘Reward T’ and the ‘Utility T’ models gave similar
confidence predictions across conditions, the ‘SSAT T’ model best corresponded with the data, as its confidence predictions increased when the variance of the
good option was low. (B) Models’ predictions for confidence reports when choosing the good option (Top Row) and when choosing the bad option (bottom row).
Predictions were averaged between trials 10–25 in each block. The average reports made by participants is displayed in grey. All models predicted higher
confidence when choosing the good option than when choosing the bad option. ‘The SSAT T’ model gave the best predictions of confidence reports. Error bars
represent SEM. The fit of the ‘Reward’, ‘Utility’ and ‘SSAT’ models are depicted in S6 Fig.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.g004
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differences in their expected values. We followed the optimality analysis described above with
the reward distribution of Experiment 2, and found that our models predicted a distinctive
and different pattern of confidence in each condition of the new design (S8 Fig).
We examined choices and confidence reports in experiment 2 in a new group of partici-
pants (N = 31). The probability of choosing the good option increased with the mean reward
of the good option (mixed effects ANOVA, F(1,89) = 21.25, p = 0.0001) and decreased with its
variance (F(1,89) = 15.03, p = 0.0005) (Fig 5B). Confidence when choosing the bad option did
Fig 5. Experiment 2 design and behavioural results. (A) In experiment 2 the rewards’ mean and variance of the bad option (black lines) were kept constant across
experimental conditions, while the mean and variance of the good option varied. Mean values could be high (mH) or low (mL), and variances could be independently high
(vH) or low (vL), resulting in four experimental conditions. (B) Experimental results (33 subjects). Both choices and confidence reports were averaged between trials 10 to
25 of each experimental block. Frequency\ of choosing the good option gradually increased as the mean expected reward increased, and as the variance decreased. (C)
When choosing the good option (middle panel), confidence ratings did not differ between the ‘mL-vL’ and ‘mH-vH’ condition. When choosing the bad option (right
panel) confidence reports were not significantly different between conditions. Error bars represent SEM. ( p<0.05,  p<0.0005).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.g005
Fig 6. Correlations between confidence, reaction time, and stability in Experiment 2. (A) We correlated each
participant’s reaction times with confidence ratings. We found that the participants’ correlation coefficients tended to
be below 0, as fast responses were associated with higher confidence. However, these were not as strongly linked across
the population, with average correlation of R = -0.067 (dashed line). (B) We examined the relations between
confidence and choice stability. We found that the participants’ correlation coefficients were highly significant in the
individual level and in the group level (average R = 0.44, dashed line). Dashed red lines indicate the average correlation
coefficient. Dark colours indicate below significance correlation (Critical value of R(160) = 0.16, p = 0.05). 
p< 0.005,  p< 0.00005.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.g006
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not change significantly across conditions (Fig 5C). When choosing the good option, confi-
dence was significantly affected by variance (F(1,89) = 35, p<0.00001) and mean (F(1,89) = 88,
p<0.00001) of the good option’s rewards. However, while confidence in the ‘mH-vL’ was sig-
nificantly higher than all other conditions (‘mH-vL’ vs ‘mH-vH’: t(30) = 4, p = 0.0003), and
confidence in the ‘mL-vH’ was lower than all other conditions (‘mL-vH’ vs. ‘mL-vL’: t(30) =
4.9, p = 0.00002), the critical comparison of ‘mL-vL’ and ‘mH-vH’ did not show a difference
(‘mL-vL’ vs. ‘mH-vH’: t(30) = 0.4, p = 0.68). Finally, we examined the relations between confi-
dence report and reaction time and found that the participants’ correlation coefficients were
significantly lower than zero (t-test, p = 0.0014, Fig 6). However, just like in Experiment 1 the
overall link across participants between confidence and reaction time was not very strong,
with average correlation coefficient of R = -0.067, below the critical value of R(160) = 0.16 for
significance of 0.05. We examined the relationship between confidence reports and choice sta-
bility, and found that the participants’ correlation coefficients were significantly higher than 0
(t-test, p< 10−13, Fig 6), with average correlation coefficient of R = 0.44.
Model-fitting and predictions
We fitted all models to the choices made by participants in Experiment 2. Like in Experiment
1, adding the acceptability threshold parameter helped explaining participants’ choice behav-
iour in all models (Table 3). We found again that the best description of the data was given by
the ‘Reward-T’ model, however not as strongly as in experiment 1 (paired t-test T vs. Reward
p = 0.25, vs. Utility p = 0.07, vs. Utility-T p = 0.05, vs. SSAT p = 0.28, vs. SSAT-T p = 0.06, Fig
7A). In accordance, all models’ estimated probability of choosing the good option in each con-
dition followed the participants’ choice pattern (S9 Fig). When examining the relationship
between individual parameters fitted by the models, we found again a high correspondence
between the parameters estimated for Acceptability Threshold and Learning Rates between
the ‘Reward-T’ and ‘SSAT-T’ model (Table 4), captured by high correlation between the indi-
vidual threshold parameters (R2 = 0.9) and learning rate parameters (R2 = 0.82) (S10 Fig).
Such similarity was not found between the ‘SSAT-T’ and ‘Utility-T’ models for neither thresh-
old parameters (R2 = 0.15) nor learning rate parameters (R2 = 0.34).
Experiment 2 was explicitly designed to test the models’ predictions of choice confidence.
We examined whether the models estimated trial-by-trial decision variables (means of rewards
for ‘Reward’ models, expected utility for the ‘Utility’ models, and probability of exceeding
acceptability threshold for the ‘SSAT’ models). Just like in Experiment 1, we focused on trials
10–25 of each experimental condition, and regressed the models’ predictions from these trials
from the confidence reports made in these trials for each participant, to obtain the individual
goodness of fit for each model (R2) (right column of Table 3, higher is better). We found that
the model which gave the best predictions of trial-by-trial confidence reports in Experiment 2
was the ‘SSAT-T’ model (paired t-test vs. Reward p = 0.0000003, vs. Reward-T p = 0.02, vs.
Utility p = 0.02, vs. Utility-T p = 0.0004, vs. SSAT p = 0.00004, Fig 7B).
Table 3. Models performance in experiment 2.
Model Sum WAIC Mean ± STD WAIC Mean ± STD Confidence R2
Reward 3,971 128.09 ± 43.39 0.18 ± 0.15
Utility 3,803 122.69 ± 35.86 0.34 ± 0.19
SSAT 3,957 127.66 ± 44.48 0.21 ± 0.18
Reward-T 3,629 117.09 ± 33.31 0.35 ± 0.15
Utility-T 3,770 121.62 ± 35.46 0.31 ± 0.13
SSAT-T 3,703 119.48 ± 33.62 0.41 ± 0.18
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.t003
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To demonstrate the pattern of confidence reports generated by each model, we calculated
the average confidence for each model’s simulation when choosing the good and the bad
options in each condition. The most striking qualitative difference between the models was in
their predictions of confidence reports when choosing the good option. All models predicted
the lowest confidence for choosing the good option with low mean and high variance (‘mL-
vH’) (Fig 8 and S11 Fig). Highest confidence was predicted when choosing the good option
with high mean and low variance (‘mH-vL’) by all models. However, ‘SSAT-T’ model was the
only one following the pattern observed in the participants’ reported confidence, predicting
similar confidence ratings for the low mean, low variance (‘mL-vL’) and the high mean, high
variance (‘mH-vH’) conditions, as the probability of exceeding the satisficing threshold was
the same for these two conditions. Critically, because these two conditions had different
expected rewards, the ‘Reward-T’ model predicted different confidence levels for them. Even
though ‘Utility-T’ model penalized options’ values according to their variance, it failed to
recover the behavioural pattern and predicted lower confidence reports in the ‘mL-vL’, com-
pared to the ‘mH-vH’, condition.
Fig 7. Models comparison in experiment 2. (A) We compared the ‘Reward T’ (lowest WAIC) model WAIC score to the other models
by examining the paired differences in WAIC scores across models and participants. The graph presents the differences of each model
WAIC from that of ‘Reward T’ model. The ‘Reward T’ model performance was not significantly better than most of the other models in
explaining participants’ choices. (B) We compared ‘SSAT T’ model (highest R2) to all other models by examining the paired differences
in R2 -scores across models and participants. The ‘SSAT T’ model gave a significantly better prediction of confidence reports than all
other models. Error bars represent SEM.  p<0.05,  p<0.005,  p<0.0005,  p<0.00005.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.g007
Table 4. Estimated models’ parameters for experiment 2 (mean ± STD).
Model Beta Learning Rate Acceptability Threshold Variance Learning Rate Risk Aversion
Reward 9.20 ± 3.73 0.56 ± 0.20
Utility 1.05 ± 0.52 0.54 ± 0.19 0.31 ± 0.13 1.00 ± 0.95
SSAT 5.22 ± 2.9 0.61 ± 0.21 0.51 ± 0.79 0.42 ± 0.15
Reward-T 12.17 ± 3.72 0.54 ± 0.17 0.38 ± 0.11
Utility-T 1.76 ± 1.4 0.43 ± 0.17 0.51 ± 0.15 0.36 ± 0.15 0.69 ± 0.59
SSAT-T 6.54 ± 2.25 0.51 ± 0.17 0.41 ± 0.09 0.33 ± 0.21
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.t004
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Discussion
We set out to examine decision-making and confidence reports in uncertain value-based
choices. In a two-armed bandit task played by human participants, the probability of choosing
the good option increased as the variance of either options’ outcomes decreased. However,
confidence ratings were associated with variance only when choosing the good (higher mean)
option, as items with low variance outcomes were chosen with higher decision confidence.
Confidence ratings associated with choosing the bad (i.e. lower mean) option were always low
and were independent of the variances of the options’ outcomes. We examined how bounded
rationality heuristics may account for this pattern of behaviour, first by introducing an accept-
ability threshold representing an expectation about the outcomes’ values, and by proposing a
stochastic satisficing model in which decisions are made by comparing the options’ probability
of exceeding this acceptability threshold [31]. We found that choice behaviour could be
accounted for by adding a threshold parameter to a simple TD learning mechanism which
tracks the expected reward of each option [21,25]. Confidence reports, however, were best cap-
tured by the stochastic satisficing model, as confidence reports scaled with the chosen option’s
satisficing probability. To directly test a critical prediction of this model, a second experiment
involving options with unequal variances and means was simulated first and then empirically
performed. As predicted by the ‘SSAT-T’ model, participants’ confidence reports matched the
options’ probability of exceeding a threshold, and not the options’ expected outcome.
In our experiments, models aimed at maximizing expected utility [4,22], modelling the
impact of risk aversion on options’ values, were not successful at explaining participants
choices or confidence reports. Maximizing the expected exponential utility function boiled
Fig 8. Model predictions for confidence reports in experiment 2. (A) Trial-by-Trial confidence reports (grey line) and model predictions during each
experimental condition are displayed, averaged across participants (shaded areas represent SEM). The ‘SSAT T’ model best corresponded with the data, as its
confidence predictions were dependent on both the mean and the variance of the reward distributions. (B) Models’ predictions for confidence reports when
choosing the good option (Top Row) and when choosing the bad option (bottom row). Predictions were averaged between trials 10–25 in each block. The average
reports made by participants is displayed in grey. SSAT-T model gave the best prediction of confidence reports. Error bars represent SEM. The fit of the ‘Reward’,
‘Utility’ and ‘SSAT’ models are depicted in S11 Fig.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399.g008
Stochastic satisficing account of confidence in uncertain value-based decisions
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399 April 5, 2018 13 / 23
down to penalizing outcomes according to their variance (i.e. Mean-Variance paradigm, see
Methods and [23,24]). An important feature of this instantiation of risk aversion is that the
effect of variance is always in the same direction, reducing the value or utility of both good and
bad options. This means that when the variance of the bad option increases, the likelihood of
choosing the good option should increase. This was not the case in our experimental results.
Our stochastic satisficing model provides a mechanism by which variance effect is not sym-
metrical for good and bad option–when the bad option’s variance increases, its value (i.e. the
probability of surpassing an acceptability threshold) increases.
Our results suggest a divergence between choice and confidence reports. Choices were best
explained by the ‘Reward-T’ model, which does not track outcome’s variance, while confi-
dence reports were best explained by the ‘SSAT-T’ model and were affected by the outcomes’
variance. Our optimality analysis also demonstrated this separation between the performance
of a ‘greedy’ decision-maker, insensitive to the size of the value-difference between options,
and a ‘noisy’ decision-maker whose likelihood of choosing the high-value option, as well as its
decision confidence, scale with the amount of evidence favouring that option. Such separation
of actions and evaluation of actions is in line with the second-order framework for self-evalua-
tion of decision performance [18]. In the second-order model suggested by Fleming and Daw,
action and confidence stem from parallel processes. Sensory input is assumed to be sampled
independently by the action and evaluation processes. In this framework, confidence is first
affected by its independent sample, and then by the action chosen by the action process. Our
results are in line with such parallel processing. Actions were accounted for by a parallel and
correlated process to the confidence generating process, and confidence was conditional on
the action selected by the client.
The second-order model [18] and other recent studies [14,17,19,32] have formulized confi-
dence as the probability of having made a correct choice over tracked outcome or evidence dis-
tribution. This approach builds on the line of research about the representation of evidence
distribution, and suggests that confidence summarizes this probabilistic representation, esti-
mating the probability of being correct. Probability of being correct is more readily defined in
perceptual detection tasks where option outcomes are not independent (e.g. the target can be
in only one of two locations but not both) and there is an objective criterion for correctness.
Our stochastic satisficing model expands these observations from perceptual decisions to sce-
narios where outcomes are stochastic. In such scenarios, our theory-based analysis of data sug-
gests, participants use an arbitrary criterion, the acceptability threshold, to evaluate the
probability of an outcome to exceed the threshold, analogous to the evaluation of correctness
probability in detection tasks. Confidence would then reflect the probability that the chosen
option exceeded the “good enough” acceptability threshold. As the likelihood of exceeding the
acceptability threshold increases–either by reducing the outcome variance (Experiment 1) or
increasing the outcome mean (Experiment 2)–so does decision confidence.
Another important divergence of our design from perceptual decision tasks is the relatively
weak link between reaction time and confidence reports. In perceptual decision making, the
entire process of evidence accumulation is encapsulated in one trial and a drift diffusion
model can therefore capture this process and predict response time and confidence at the
same time [16,29]. In our learning task, evidence about each option’s reward distribution was
accumulated across trials–on each trial, the participant sampled one option and learned from
its reward. In this case, the link between reaction time and confidence reports may not be as
strong as in the perceptual tasks. Our ‘choice stability’ measure was found to be highly corre-
lated with confidence reports. This measure can be interpreted as an indication of how many
favourable examples the participant accumulated before making the confidence report. This
process is similar to the evidence accumulation process modelled by the drift diffusion model,
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but in our case the accumulation is across trials and not within a trial. This discrimination is
important and may shed light on evidence accumulation process in the brain. Our design pro-
vides an opportunity for future research on the neural mechanism of metacognition, as it inte-
grates previous knowledge about representation of variance [33,34] in the brain with the
literature on neural mechanism of metacognition [15,35], and allows a better dissociation of
decision and confidence in the brain.
In the 1950s Simon introduced the concept of satisficing, by which decision makers settle
for an option that satisfies some threshold or criterion instead of finding the optimal solution.
The idea is illustrated in the contrast between ’looking for the sharpest needle in the haystack’
(optimizing) and ’looking for a needle sharp enough to sew with’ (satisficing) (p. 244) [12,36].
This notion of acceptability threshold has been extended to other ambiguous situations [37],
for example for setting a limit (i.e. threshold) to the time and resources an organization invests
in learning a new capability [12], where suboptimal solution may be balanced with preventing
unnecessary cost. We suggest that stochastic satisficing serves a similar objective by extending
the basic idea of satisficing into stochastic contexts with continuous payoff domains [13]. We
found stochastic satisficing to be particularly useful at explaining decisions’ confidence, i.e.
evaluation of decisions. Bounded rationality was originally developed to explain administrative
decision making [11], in which decisions are often evaluated explicitly, and the decision maker
is held accountable for the outcome [38]. Stochastic satisficing may therefore serve psychologi-
cal and social purposes associated with the evaluation, communication and justification of
decision-making [39,40]. As it strives to avoid catastrophe, i.e. receiving a reward below
acceptability threshold, stochastic satisficing may be useful to minimize regret, similarly to sta-
tus quo bias [41,42]. Choosing the option less likely to provide unacceptable payoffs can serve
as a safe argument for justifying decisions to oneself or others [38], in the spirit of the saying
“nobody ever got fired for buying IBM”.
Methods
Participants
We recruited participants through Amazon M-Turk online platform [43]. All participants pro-
vided an informed consent. Experiments were approved by UCL Research Ethics Committee
(project ID 5375/001). Participants earned a fixed monetary compensation, but also a perfor-
mance-based bonus if they collected more than 10,000 points. 88 participants were recruited
for the first experiment, in order to obtain power of 0.8 with expected effect size of 0.4 for vari-
ance effect on confidence. The actual effect size obtained in Experiment 1 was 0.6, and we
therefore recruited 33 subjects for the second experiment. 25 participants were excluded from
analysis as their performance was at chance level (16 participants) or for using only one level
for confidence reports (9 participants). Data from 96 participants (62 males aged 32±9 (mean
±std), and 34 females aged 32±8) were analysed.
Experimental procedure and design
On each trial participants chose between two doors, each leading to a reward between 1 and
100 points (Fig 1A). Each door had a fixed colour-pattern along the task, but the positions (left
vs. right) were chosen randomly. Subjects made choices by using a 12-level confidence scale:
1–6 towards one option and 1–6 towards the other, with 6 indicating ‘most certain’ and 1 indi-
cating ‘most uncertain’. Following choice, subjects observed the reward of the chosen door
drawn from a normal distribution N(μi,σi2), where i was a or b, indicating one or the other
door. A working demo of the task can be found here: http://urihertz.net/BanditConfDemo/.
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Experiment 1 consisted of 240 trials and included six stable blocks where the mean and vari-
ance of each option’s reward remained constant. Each block lasted at least 25 trials. The transi-
tion from one block to another occurred along 10 trials during which the mean and variance
associated with each door changed gradually in a linear fashion, from their current to the new
levels corresponding to the upcoming block. Embedded within these six blocks, four blocks fol-
lowed a 2x2 design where the mean rewards of the two options were 65 (for the good option)
and 35 (for the bad option), and their variances could be independently high (H = 252 = 625) or
low (L = 102 = 100) (Fig 1B). This design included four conditions: ‘vL-vL’,’vH-vL’,’vL-vH’ and
‘vH-vH’, where the first and the second letters indicated the magnitude of the variance of the
good and the bad options, respectively.
Experiment 2 consisted of 160 trials and was similarly composed of blocks of fixed reward
probability distributions. In all four blocks, the reward of one option always followed a Gauss-
ian distribution with a mean of 35 and a variance of 100 (102). The mean of the other option
could take either high (mH = 72) or low (mL = 57), and its variance could be either high
(vH = 202 = 400) or low (vL = 52 = 25). This produced a 2x2 design, with the four conditions
denoted by ‘mL-vL’, ‘mL-vH’, ‘mH-vH’, ‘mL-vL’(Fig 5A).
Models
Six different models were fitted to the participants’ choices. These included models that track
only mean of the rewards from each option, and models that track both mean and variance.
The ‘Reward’ model assumes that expected reward of the outcomes govern choices, and it
tracks the means of the rewards using a temporal difference algorithm [21,25].
Qaðt þ 1Þ ¼ QaðtÞ þ aðRðtÞ   QaðtÞÞ
Qbðt þ 1Þ ¼ QbðtÞ
ð1Þ
(
Where a and b indicate the chosen and the un-chosen options, respectively. α is the learning
rate. A softmax action-selection rule was used:
pðaÞ ¼
expðbQaðtÞÞ
expðbQaðtÞÞ þ expðbQbðtÞÞ
ð2Þ
Where β is the rate of exploration. Therefore, the ‘Reward’ model has 2 free parameters: {α, β}.
The ‘Utility’ model tracks both mean and variance of rewards from the two options. Track-
ing the mean of rewards is done in a similar manner to the ‘Reward’ model (Eq (1)). Tracking
of variance is done using a similar temporal difference rule:
Vaðt þ 1Þ ¼ VaðtÞ þ g  ððRðtÞ   QaðtÞÞ
2
  VaðtÞÞ
Vbðt þ 1Þ ¼ VbðtÞ
ð3Þ
(
Where γ is the variance learning rate. This model assumes an increasing and concave exponen-
tial utility function [5,24]by which the utility of a reward decreases as the reward increases:
UðQÞ ¼   e  lQ l > 0 ð4Þ
λ denotes the risk sensitivity of the participant, the larger λ is, the more risk averse the par-
ticipant is. When rewards are governed by a Gaussian distribution is it possible to evaluate the
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expected utility of an option analytically [22,24].
EUaðtÞ ¼
1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pVaðtÞ
p
Z1
  1
  elxe 
ðx  QaðtÞÞ
2VaðtÞ dx ð5Þ
Using the tracked variance and mean of the rewards, the value to maximize (for option a,
for example) is:
EUaðtÞ / QaðtÞ  
lVaðtÞ
2
ð6Þ
This is a formulation of the variance-mean balance, in which choices’ expected utility
depends on the expected reward, and penalized by the variance of rewards [23,24]. A softmax
rule (Eq (2)) was used for action selection with the expected utilities as the values associated
with each option. The ‘Utility’ model has 4 free parameters: {α, γ, λ, β}.
The Stochastic satisficing (SSAT) model employs a threshold heuristic [13]. It tracks the
means (Eq (1)) and variances (Eq (3)) associated with the two options. The probability of pay-
off being higher than the acceptability threshold, T, is calculated using a cumulative Gaussian
distribution equation:
SPaðtÞ ¼
1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2pVaðtÞ
p
Z1
T
  elxe 
ðx  QaðtÞÞ
2VaðtÞ dx ð7Þ
where SPa indicated the probability of action a being satisficing. A softmax (Eq (2)) rule is
used to calculate choice probabilities according to the options’ satisficing probabilities (SPa
and SPb).
In addition to these three models, we tested a version of all three models in which the
unchosen option (in the example below option b was not chosen) drifts towards an acceptabil-
ity threshold T:
Qaðt þ 1Þ ¼ QaðtÞ þ aðRðtÞ   QaðtÞÞ
Qbðt þ 1Þ ¼ QbðtÞ þ aðT   QbðtÞÞ
ð8Þ
(
This rule was use in the ‘Reward-T’ and ‘Utility-T’ models, adding to them an additional
free parameter T. This rule was also used in the ‘SSAT-T’ model, using the threshold parameter
T which was already used in the ‘SSAT’ model.
Optimization analyses
We carried two analyses to examine the optimal performance our models are capable of in our
experimental design, in terms of amount of reward accrued. In the first analyses we used
parameter estimation (Nelder-Mead algorithm implemented by Matlab’s fminsearch function)
to identify a set of parameters that maximizes each model’s accumulated reward. We then sim-
ulated the model choices using the identified parameters, and tracked how much reward was
collected by each model over 100 repetitions.
In the second optimality analyses we set the reward distribution parameters, and exam-
ined the differences in values assigned to each option in each experimental design by the
different models. We changed the value of the acceptability threshold, and examined how
it affected the model’s estimations. This analysis allows a detection of the pattern of confi-
dence and choice probabilities across conditions during steady state–after the reward distri-
butions were learned.
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Model fitting and model comparison
For each model, we used Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling implemented in the STAN soft-
ware package [44] to fit the free parameters of each model to the choice data, in a subject-by-
subject fashion, in order to maximize likelihood [45]. The Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) process used for optimization produces a likelihood distribution over the parameter
space of the model, for each subject. For model comparisons, we calculated Watanabe Akaike
Information Criterion (WAIC) that uses these likelihood distributions and penalizes for the
number of free parameters [28]. We then simulated each model, using the estimated posterior
distribution over the individual parameters of that model, in order to produce the model’s
value estimations associated with each option during the experiment. We used these estimated
values to predict the model’s confidence ratings for the choices made by participants.
Supporting information
S1 Fig. Trial-by-trial optimality analysis experiment 1. We identified parameters that maxi-
mized the amount of reward accumulated by each of our models with the reward distribution
from experiment 1, and examined the amount of reward collected by the models using these
parameters over 100 repetitions. We also examined the rewards accrued by a model with full
knowledge of the reward distribution (‘Omniscient’), and the actual amount of reward accrued
by our participants. We found that all three models performed similarly, and accrued similar
amount of reward. When the drifting mechanism was added (drift of the unchosen option
towards the acceptability threshold) performance of all models decreased. All models did not
accrue as much reward as the ‘Omniscient’ model, as all of them had to learn and adapt to a
dynamic and changing environment. In addition, all models performed much better than our
participants, indicating that participants’ behaviour was noisy, falling short of the optimal
strategy.
(PDF)
S2 Fig. Value-Differences optimality analysis in experiment 1. We examined the differences
in values assigned to the two options by each model in the four conditions of our experimental
design. We used the reward distributions mean and variances in each condition, and varied
the acceptability threshold (blue to yellow lines). We found that all models assigned higher val-
ues to the high mean reward option than to the low mean reward option in almost all the cases
and conditions. A greedy decision maker would therefore be able to accumulate similar
amount of rewards using each model. However, different models assigned different value dif-
ferences in each condition. This means that a noisy decision maker (modeled using softmax)
may be more likely to choose the low mean reward option in some conditions, according to
the models’ predictions.
(PDF)
S3 Fig. Models fit to choices in experiment 1. (A) Trial-by-Trial frequency of choosing the
good option across participants (grey line) and models estimations of probability of choosing
the good option (coloured lines), averaged across participants (shaded areas represent SEM).
(B) Models’ estimations were averaged between trials 10–25 in each block. The average choices
made by participants is displayed in grey. The models lacking the drift-to-threshold mecha-
nism (top row) showed less correspondence to the behavioural results. In addition, both ‘Util-
ity’ models failed to replicate the low probability of choosing the good option in the vHvH
condition (compared to vLvH condition), as they penalised both high and low mean options
for variance in the same manner, whereas the SAT models penalised the good (high mean)
option for variance, but promoted the bad option when its variance increased. The overall best
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fitting model, across all trials, was the ‘Reward T’. Error bars represent SEM.
(PDF)
S4 Fig. Distribution of best model fits across participants. We examined how many of the
participants’ choices were best explained by each of our six models in both experiments (left
panels), and how many participants’ confidence reports were best predicted by the models
(right panels). We found that in Experiment 1 most of the participants’ choices were best
explained by models that did not track reward variance, in line with the model comparisons
we performed. In Experiment 2 choice responses were split between models that tracked vari-
ance and models that did not track variance. Best confidence ratings predictions were also dis-
tributed across participants. We found that in Experiment 1 most participants’ confidence
reports were affected by variance, with half of the participants’ confidence reports best pre-
dicted by the SSAT or SSAT-T models. In Experiment 2 the picture was even more robust,
with even greater share of the participants’ reports being affected by outcome variance. The
distributions of confidence and choices were found to be different (Two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, Experiment 1: p = 0.0049, Experiment 2: p = 0.03).
(PDF)
S5 Fig. Relations between estimated parameters in different models in experiment 1. We
compared the individual parameters estimated for each of our drift (and best performing)
models. The Reward-T and SSAT-T models’ parameters for learning rates and threshold were
almost identical for all our participants. Reward model gave the best fit to decisions, while the
SSAT-T model gave the best fit to confidence reports. This indicates that these models may use
a shared mechanism for decisions, but the SSAT-T model uses the reward variance informa-
tion to generate confidence reports. Parameters estimations were not as similar for the
SSAT-T and the Utility-T.
(PDF)
S6 Fig. Model predictions for confidence reports in experiment 1. (A) Trial-by-Trial confi-
dence reports (grey line) and model predictions during each experimental condition are dis-
played, averaged across participants (shaded areas represent SEM). (B) Models’ predictions for
confidence reports when choosing the good option (Top Row) and when choosing the bad
option (bottom row). Predictions were averaged between trials 10–25 in each block. The average
reports made by participants is displayed in grey. All models predicted higher confidence when
choosing the good option than when choosing the bad option. Error bars represent SEM.
(PDF)
S7 Fig. Power utility model performance in experiment 1. To examine other utility functions
we fitted a utility model which transforms the rewards in each trial according to the power util-
ity function [1,2]:
UðRÞ ¼
Rð1  gÞ
1   g
0  g < 1
Where γ is the risk aversion factor–the closer it is to 1 the participant is more risk averse (and
the closer the function is to log(r)). We used a model that learns from these transformed val-
ues, i.e. from utilities and not directly from the rewards, but was otherwise exactly the same as
the ‘Reward’ model:
Qaðt þ 1Þ ¼ QaðtÞ þ aðUðRðtÞÞ   QaðtÞÞ
Qbðtþ 1Þ ¼ QbðtÞ
(
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When option a is chosen, its value is updated according to the difference between its current
value and the utility of the option’s current reward, with a learning rate α. Decision in each
trial was then carried using a softmax rule.
We fitted this ‘Power’ model to the choice data, and an additional ‘Power-T’ model which
added the drift to threshold of the unchosen option mechanism:
Qaðt þ 1Þ ¼ QaðtÞ þ aðUðRðtÞÞ   QaðtÞÞ
Qbðtþ 1Þ ¼ QbðtÞ þ aðT   QbðtÞÞ
(
We examined the fit of these models to the data and how well they predicted the confidence
reports.
We found that the ‘Power’ and ‘Power-T’ models performed very similarly to the ‘Reward’ and
‘Reward-T’ models respectively. Their WAIC values were: ‘Power’ 228.06 ± 67.46, ‘Power-T’:
214.51 ± 68.66, whereas the ‘Reward’ models WAIC values were: ‘Reward’ 226.55 ± 67.67,
‘Reward-T’ 214.57 ± 68.79. ‘Power-T’ was as good as our best model in explaining choice
behaviour.
We than examined how well the ‘Power’ models explained confidence reports. Again, they
fared similarly to the ‘Reward’ models with linear fit (R2) of: Power’ 0.21 ± 0.22, ‘Power-T’:
0.21 ± 0.21, whereas the ‘Reward’ models WAIC values were: ‘Reward’ 0.21 ± 0.22, ‘Reward-T’
0.21 ± 0.21.
Finally, we examined the predicted confidence reports in the four condition blocks, and found
that the patterns predicted by the ‘Power-T’ model were identical to the pattern predicted by
the ‘Reward’ model. We concluded that the transformation of reward in a trial by trial manner
did not introduce any new mechanism to learning beyond the one already implemented by the
‘Reward’ model.
(PDF)
S8 Fig. Value-Differences optimality analysis in experiment 2. We followed the same opti-
mality analysis as in S3 Fig with the reward distributions from experiment 2, and varied the
acceptability threshold (blue to yellow lines). We found that the models varied dramatically in
the relative values they assigned the options. Again, a greedy decision maker would therefore
be able to accumulate similar amount of rewards using each model. However, a noisy decision
maker (modeled using softmax) may be more likely to choose the low mean reward option in
some conditions, according to the models’ predictions.
(PDF)
S9 Fig. Models fit to choices in experiment 2. (A) Trial-by-Trial frequency of choosing the
good option across participants (grey line) and models estimations of probability of choosing
the good option (coloured lines), averaged across participants (shaded areas represent SEM).
(B) Models’ estimations were averaged between trials 10–25 in each block. The average choices
made by participants is displayed in grey. Most models were able to capture the pattern of the
participants’ choice behaviour. overall best fitting model, across all trials, was the ‘Reward T’.
(PDF)
S10 Fig. Relations between estimated parameters in different models in experiment 2. We
compared the individual parameters estimated for each of our drift (and best performing)
models. The Reward-T and SSAT-T models’ parameters for learning rates and threshold were
almost identical for all our participants. Reward model gave the best fit to decisions, while the
SSAT-T model gave the best fit to confidence reports. This indicates that these models may use
Stochastic satisficing account of confidence in uncertain value-based decisions
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195399 April 5, 2018 20 / 23
a shared mechanism for decisions, but the SSAT-T model uses the reward variance informa-
tion to generate confidence reports. Parameters estimations were not as similar for the
SSAT-T and the Utility-T.
(PDF)
S11 Fig. Model predictions for confidence reports in experiment 2. (A) Trial-by-Trial confi-
dence reports (grey line) and model predictions during each experimental condition are dis-
played, averaged across participants (shaded areas represent SEM). (B) Models’ predictions for
confidence reports when choosing the good option (Top Row) and when choosing the bad
option (bottom row). Predictions were averaged between trials 10–25 in each block. The aver-
age reports made by participants is displayed in grey. All models predicted higher confidence
when choosing the good option than when choosing the bad option. Error bars represent
SEM.
(PDF)
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